Ghana’s Gold Programme Losses Raise Central-Bank Recapitalisation And External-Liquidity Risk
The Domestic Gold Purchase Programme’s approximately GH¢22 billion gross 2025 loss, incurred at the Bank of Ghana, raises contingent-fiscal and reserve-adequacy concerns. The key transmission is into cedi stability and Ghana sovereign Eurobond risk, particularly at the long end, through recapitalisation needs and external-liquidity pressure.
MSA market desk
Desk brief
Ghana’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme generated approximately GH¢22 billion in gross losses in 2025, with the losses arising on the Bank of Ghana’s balance sheet rather than GoldBod’s accounts. Accounting offsets reduced the net loss reported by the central bank, but the IMF has linked the programme to central-bank balance-sheet and fiscal risks. The programme was launched amid depleted foreign-exchange buffers, exchange-rate pressure and weakened investor confidence.
The immediate transmission is through Bank of Ghana capital and reserve intermediation. A weaker central-bank balance sheet can increase the probability of recapitalisation or wider public-sector support, adding to sovereign contingent liabilities. Any impairment of the programme’s contribution to reserve accumulation would also constrain external liquidity, leaving the cedi more exposed to renewed exchange-rate pressure and increasing the local-currency burden of Ghana’s external debt service. For Ghana sovereign Eurobonds, the principal risk is a higher fiscal and external-liquidity premium, with longer-dated bonds carrying greater duration exposure if credibility deteriorates.
The distinction between gross and net losses matters for assessing the scale of the immediate fiscal hit, but it does not remove the balance-sheet channel: the IMF’s concern is that gold-trading operations transferred risk to the central bank while reserve buffers were already weak. That makes Ghana’s external financing profile more sensitive to evidence that the programme is rebuilding reserves rather than creating additional public-sector support needs.
The next conditional point is the treatment of Bank of Ghana capital and the programme’s effect on foreign-exchange buffers. A credible recapitalisation framework alongside demonstrable reserve accumulation would contain the sovereign-credit transmission; continued balance-sheet pressure would reinforce cedi and external-liquidity risk and weigh most heavily on Ghana’s longer-maturity external debt.
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